Introduction
Community health workers (CHWs) provide basic health promotion and healthcare within the communities in which they live. They are supported by the health system but are not necessarily a formal part of it.1 CHWs are often cited as part of the solution to the shortage of health workers and lack of universal access to healthcare in low-income settings2 3 and feature prominently in the WHO’s Workforce 2030 strategy for Human Resources for Health.4 They have two distinguishing features when compared with other potential providers of healthcare: being from the community in which they serve engenders trust from their clients, particularly when the community have been involved with their selection5 and, by travelling to clients’ homes, they reduce the need for long, difficult and/or expensive journeys to healthcare facilities. There is accumulating evidence that CHWs can provide individual health interventions effectively, for example, screening for and treatment of tuberculosis and promoting immunisation uptake.6 7 Many CHW programme providers are now starting to increase the scope of CHWs’ activities, for example, with CHWs providing integrated community case management, which includes screening for malnutrition and detection and treatment of malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea in children.8 9
There is some evidence that these more formal, integrated CHW programmes can be a cost-effective component of health services, particularly for child health outcomes,10 11 and modelling shows the potential high long-run economic returns from investing in CHW programmes.8 However, by September 2016, the campaign to have one million CHWs in rural sub-Saharan Africa by the end of 2015 had counted just 332 000 (data available for 37 countries).12 There are three potential economic reasons for the shortfall. First, the total cost of initial scale-up and maintenance of CHW programmes is high: McCord and colleagues estimate annual maintenance costs of US$3.4 billion in 2012 prices per year across sub-Saharan Africa.13 Second, CHW programmes have to compete with other priorities for limited government resources, such as other cadres of health personnel. Third, even where financial resources are available, there are inevitable delays before CHWs can start working including the time taken to design appropriate programmes, build an effective supply chain and recruit and train CHWs.
One particularly malleable component of CHW programme costs is the incentive or reward paid to CHWs for their time and effort. Rewards vary widely across programmes. Of the CHWs enumerated in the one million CHWs campaign, 13% were reported as being salaried, 67% received a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives, 18% received non-monetary incentives and 2% received no incentives at all.12 There can also be different ‘cadres’ of CHW within a health system: in Ethiopia, for example, salaried health extension workers are supported by a volunteer health development army. Although paying CHWs has generally become the accepted standard,4 8 14 it has also been argued that ‘financial incentives that are too low, irregularly paid or discontinued due to a lack of sustainable programme financing may result in more of a disincentive to CHWs than no payment at all’.15 A properly set-up CHW programme staffed by volunteer CHWs could therefore be appropriate where the alternative is no CHW programme at all given the local health and economic returns that could be realised.
The resources available to fund CHW programmes depend on total government expenditure, the proportion of such expenditure allocated to healthcare in general (and a CHW programme in particular) and the availability of external funding, including from donors, low-cost loans and human capital bonds repaid over an extended period based on future contingent savings.8 However, external sources of finance may not be reliable and may divert national resources away from healthcare, rather than supplementing it.16–19 There is also the possibility that aid is misused and does not reach its intended destination. The long-term optimal position would therefore be that nations can fund their own CHW programmes without requiring external aid.
The cost of a CHW programme and the resources available to pay for it therefore influence, at least in part, the scale of the programme in any particular country. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the affordability of comprehensive CHW programmes would be affected by varying CHWs’ salaries and the resources available to pay for them. We also examine the relationship between the level of economic development in a country (proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita) and the affordability of a CHW programme. Our work complements that of Bossert and Ono,17 who challenge the affordability of the WHO target of 2.3 physicians, nurses or midwives per 1000 population, and extends that of Oxford Policy Management,20 which estimated that a CHW programme in Pakistan providing 74% population coverage would require 27% of total government healthcare spending to be devoted to CHWs. As in this study in Pakistan, we provide a relative analysis to show CHW programme costs as a proportion of the public funding available for healthcare as a whole. By doing so across all mainland countries of sub-Saharan Africa, we are able to illustrate how the challenge of financing a CHW programme varies across countries. This multi-national approach enables us to explore the extent to which this variation can be explained by the level of economic development in each country.